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Abstract: In this paper, a secure communication model for cognitive multi-user massive multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) systems with underlay spectrum sharing is investigated. A secondary
(cognitive) multi-user massive MIMO system is operated by using underlay spectrum sharing within
a primary (licensed) multi-user massive MIMO system. A passive multi-antenna eavesdropper is
assumed to be eavesdropping upon either the primary or secondary confidential transmissions.
To this end, a physical layer security strategy is provisioned for the primary and secondary
transmissions via artificial noise (AN) generation at the primary base-station (PBS) and zero-forcing
precoders. Specifically, the precoders are constructed by using the channel estimates with pilot
contamination. In order to degrade the interception of confidential transmissions at the eavesdropper,
the AN sequences are transmitted at the PBS by exploiting the excess degrees-of-freedom offered by its
massive antenna array and by using random AN shaping matrices. The channel estimates at the PBS
and secondary base-station (SBS) are obtained by using non-orthogonal pilot sequences transmitted
by the primary user nodes (PUs) and secondary user nodes (SUs), respectively. Hence, these channel
estimates are affected by intra-cell pilot contamination. In this context, the detrimental effects of
intra-cell pilot contamination and channel estimation errors for physical layer secure communication
are investigated. For this system set-up, the average and asymptotic achievable secrecy rate
expressions are derived in closed-form. Specifically, these performance metrics are studied for
imperfect channel state information (CSI) and for perfect CSI, and thereby, the secrecy rate degradation
due to inaccurate channel knowledge and intra-cell pilot contamination is quantified. Our analysis
reveals that a physical layer secure communication can be provisioned for both primary and secondary
massive MIMO systems even with the channel estimation errors and pilot contamination.
Keywords: massive MIMO; pilot contamination; cognitive radio; physical layer security; artificial noise
1. Introduction
Massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) is currently being investigated as one of the
key enabling technologies for the 5th generation wireless standard [1]. Specifically, in massive MIMO
systems, very large antenna arrays are used for aggressive spatial multiplexing and focusing radiated
energy towards desired spatial directions [2,3]. Thereby, massive MIMO can potentially provide
unprecedented gains in spectral and energy efficiencies compared to conventional MIMO.
Confidentiality of transmitted information is one of the key challenges for system designers
of next generation wireless communication networks [4]. To protect confidential communication
against intruders and eavesdropper attacks, the concept of physical layer security [5–9] has recently
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attracted significant interest to complement current cryptographic approaches on higher layers. These
techniques realize secure communication directly at the physical layer by exploiting the noisiness and
imperfection of the wireless communication channel for degrading the quality of signal reception at
eavesdroppers, and thereby prevent them from eavesdropping upon the confidential information from
the intercepted signals [4].
Another concept that promises significant gains in performance for wireless communication
networks are so-called cognitive radio networks. These cognitive networks allow secondary systems
to access the licensed spectrum of the primary systems by exploiting the underlay spectrum sharing
techniques, and thereby, mitigating the spectrum under-utilization of current wireless systems and
significantly improving the spectral efficiency [10]. In cognitive radio systems, where the primary
spectrum is an open medium to be accessed and utilized by the secondary systems, achieving
end-to-end security is a crucial challenge to the system designs and configurations. Information
theoretic secrecy provisioning for cognitive radio networks has been investigated, e.g., in [11,12].
In the event that the eavesdroppers intercept confidential signals passively, they do not transmit
in order to conceal their existence. Therefore, the acquisition of the channel state information (CSI) of
the eavesdropping channels at the massive MIMO base-stations (BSs) will be difficult. Although the
null-space beamforming techniques can be effectively used in conventional MIMO BS for provisioning
of physical layer security, constructing such sophisticated precoders at the massive MIMO BSs
will be prohibitively complicated. Alternatively, artificial noise (AN) sequences can be exploited
for massive MIMO BSs. In this context, massive MIMO techniques can be used in cognitive radio
systems for provisioning physical layer security by exploiting the large antenna arrays at the BSs to
simultaneously transmit confidential signals towards the legitimate user nodes and AN sequences
towards eavesdroppers for perturbing the intercepted signals.
Notwithstanding that the massive MIMO techniques have received significant interest recently,
little research exists on securing massive MIMO systems by exploiting physical layer security strategies.
Next, some of the important contributions to the development of physical layer provisioning in massive
MIMO systems are summarized. In [13], a secure transmission scheme for single-hop massive MIMO
systems is investigated by deriving the secrecy rates and secrecy outage probabilities for perfect
and imperfect CSI. Furthermore, in [14], the effects of linear precoding of data and AN in secure
massive MIMO downlink are studied. Specifically, in [14], linear precoders that are based on matrix
polynomials are proposed for both data and AN precoding, and consequently, the corresponding
polynomial coefficients are optimized to minimize the sum mean-squared error and the AN leakage
to the user nodes. In [15], optimal power allocation with security constraints in multi-user massive
MIMO systems with distributed antennas is investigated. Moreover, in [16], the physical layer security
and energy efficiency aspects are investigated for massive MIMO-enabled heterogeneous cloud radio
access networks.
Although there is a symbiotic relationship between massive MIMO and cognitive radio networks
to achieve a groundbreaking spectral and energy efficiencies for future wireless systems, facilitating
secrecy at the physical layer of cognitive massive MIMO systems has not yet received any attention
in the existing studies in the literature. To fill this gap, in this paper, a secure downlink transmission
strategy is investigated for cognitive massive MIMO systems with underlay spectrum sharing in the
presence of a passive multi-antenna eavesdropper. To this end, a secondary massive MIMO system
is allowed to access the licensed spectrum of a primary massive system subject to an interference
temperature constraint, which is the maximum tolerable co-channel interference (CCI) power at
the primary system. Consequently, the secondary transmit power is constrained such that the CCI
inflicted at the primary system due to secondary concurrent transmission is maintained below this
interference temperature. The motive of the eavesdropper is to intercept the confidential transmissions
of the primary or secondary systems. By assuming that the eavesdropper’s CSI is unavailable, AN
sequences are generated at the primary base-station (PBS) for provisioning physical layer security by
exploiting the additional degrees-of-freedom offered by its massive antenna array. The construction
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of null-space-based AN shaping precoders at the PBS is prohibitively complicated due to its massive
antenna array, and hence, random AN shaping matrices are advocated. Furthermore, zero-forcing (ZF)
based precoders are used at the PBS and the secondary base-station (SBS).
The uplink channels of the primary and secondary systems are estimated at the corresponding
BSs by using pilots transmitted by the primary user nodes (PUs) and secondary user nodes (SUs),
respectively. The number of orthogonal pilot sequences is limited and depends on the coherence
interval of the wireless channels [2]. Hence, the same pilot sequence is shared among both PUs
and SUs for minimum mean square error (MMSE) channel estimation. Nevertheless, a normalized
pseudo-inverse of a complex Gaussian random matrix is used for AN shaping at the PBS, and thereby,
the burden of estimating the eavesdropper’s channels is avoided.
The performance of the aforementioned system set-up is investigated by deriving the achievable
secrecy rates in closed-form for both imperfect and perfect channel state information (CSI) cases.
The impacts of the numbers of PBS and SBS antennas are investigated in the context of provisioning
physical layer secure transmission for cognitive massive MIMO systems. Furthermore, the detrimental
effects of intra-cell secondary interference, channel estimation errors, intra-cell pilot contamination,
and AN leakage into the desired signals at the PUs and SUs are investigated for the imperfect and
perfect CSI cases. Thereby, the achievable secrecy rate degradation due to intra-cell pilot contamination
and inaccurate channel estimation is quantified.
Notation: A∗, AT , AH , and [A]k,l denote the conjugate, transpose, Hermitian-transpose, and the
(k, l)th element of a matrix A, respectively. E[·] is the expectation and the operator ⊗ denotes the
Kronecker product.
2. System, Channel, and Signal Models
In this section, the system, channel, and signal models of a cognitive multi-user massive MIMO
system are presented.
2.1. System and Channel Model
We consider a cognitive multi-user MIMO network with underlay spectrum sharing (see Figure 1).
A multi-user secondary MIMO system is underlaid within a primary multi-user MIMO system.
The secondary system shares the same licensed frequency spectrum of the primary system by
exploiting the concepts of cognitive underlay spectrum sharing [10]. The primary system consists
of an NP-antennas PBS and K single-antenna PUs. In the secondary system, M single-antenna SUs
are served by an NS-antenna SBS. The ratio between the numbers of BS antennas at the primary and
secondary systems is defined as β = NP/NS. The numbers of antennas at the PBS and SBS can grow
without limit compared to the numbers of PUs and SUs, (NP  K) and (NS  M), while keeping a
fixed ratio β = NP/NS. Moreover, an NE-antenna eavesdropper seeks passively to eavesdrop upon
the information transmitted to user nodes, either in the primary or secondary system.
Let FT ∈ C(K×NP) be the channel matrix between the PBS and PUs, and GT ∈ C(M×NS) is the
channel matrix between the SBS and SUs. Here, VT ∈ C(K×NS) and UT ∈ C(M×NP) are the interference
channel matrices between the SBS and PUs and between the PBS and SUs, respectively. Moreover,
HTP ∈ C(NE×NP) is the channel matrix between the PBS and the eavesdropper, and HTS ∈ C(NE×NS) is
the channel matrix between the SBS and the eavesdropper. For the sake of the brevity of exposition,
all the aforementioned channels can be correspondingly defined in the following general expression:
C = D1/2C C˜, (1)
where C ∈ {F, G, V, U, HP, HS}, C˜ ∼ CN P×Q
(
0P×Q, IP ⊗ IQ
)
models the independent small-scale
Rayleigh fading, and diagonal matrix DC = diag(ζC1 , · · · , ζCQ) captures the path-loss.
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Figure 1. System model for a multi-user cognitive massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
network in the presence of a multi-antenna eavesdropper. PBS: primary base station; SBS: secondary
base station; PU: primary user node; SU: secondary user node.
2.2. Uplink Training and Channel Estimation
In massive MIMO systems, the uplink CSI is estimated at the BS from the uplink pilot sequences
transmitted by the user nodes during the training period of the coherence interval (T). Then, the
downlink channel is obtained from the uplink CSI by exploiting the channel reciprocity in time-division
duplex (TDD) mode of operation. Here, for the sake of exposition, we assume that the numbers of PUs
and SUs are the same (K = M). Therefore, all the PUs and SUs transmit simultaneously (τ) symbols of
T as pilot sequences. The received pilot signals at the PBS and SBS are given by:
YP =
√
τPUFΦP +
√
τPUUΦS + ZP, (2a)
YS =
√
τPUGΦS +
√
τPUVΦP + ZS, (2b)
respectively, where PU is the average transmit power of each pilot symbol, ΦP is a K× τ pilot symbol
matrix transmitted by the PUs, whereΦHP is a τ×K unitary matrix (τ ≥ K) satisfyingΦPΦHP = IK, and
ΦS is an K× τ pilot symbol matrix transmitted by the SUs, whereΦHS is a τ× K unitary matrix (τ ≥ K)
satisfying ΦSΦHS = IK. Furthermore, ZP and ZS are additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) matrices
at the PBS and SBS with independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) CN (0, 1) elements, respectively.
In (2), all pilot sequences are non-orthogonal, i.e., the primary and secondary systems share the same
pilot sequences, i.e., ΦP = ΦS = Φ, which practically represents the worst-case scenario. Thus,
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the uplink channel estimates at the PBS and SBS are affected by pilot contamination, then the MMSE
channel estimate of F can be derived as [3]:
Fˆ =
1√
τPU
YPΦP
(
DF + DU +
IK
τPU
)−1
DF
=
(
F + U +
ZF√
τPU
)(
DF + DU +
IK
τPU
)−1
DF, (3)
where ZF = ZPΦP is an estimation noise matrix consisting of i.i.d. CN (0, 1) elements. In (3), F and ZF
are statistically independent. Let EF be the estimation error matrix of F. By using MMSE properties,
the channel can be decomposed as:
F = Fˆ + EF. (4)
From the property of MMSE estimation, Fˆ and EF are independent. Furthermore, the rows of Fˆ and
EF are mutually independent and distributed as CN (0, DˆF) and CN (0, DF − DˆF), respectively, where
DˆF is a diagonal matrix, whose k-th diagonal element is:
σ2Fˆk
=
τPUζ2Fk
τPU
(
ζFk + ζUk
)
+ 1
. (5)
Next, by applying steps similar to those used for deriving (3), the MMSE channel estimate of G
can be derived as follows:
Gˆ =
(
G + V +
ZG√
τPU
)(
DG + DV +
IM
τPU
)−1
DG, (6)
where ZG = ZSΦS is a noise matrix with i.i.d. CN (0, 1) random variables. Both G and ZG in (6) are
statistically independent. The estimation error matrix of G at SBS is denoted by EG, where the channel
can be decomposed as:
G = Gˆ + EG. (7)
Again, Gˆ and EG are independent. Also, the rows of Gˆ and EG are mutually independent and
distributed as CN (0, DˆG) and CN (0, DG − DˆG), respectively, where DˆG is a diagonal matrix whose
m-th diagonal element is given by:
σ2Gˆm
=
τPUζ2Gm
τPU (ζGm + ζVm) + 1
. (8)
2.3. Signal Model
In this section, the signal model is presented, and thereby the signal-to-interference-plus-noise
ratios (SINRs) are derived.
2.3.1. Transmit Power Constraint for the SBS
In underlay spectrum sharing cognitive systems, the power of the secondary transmissions is
constrained such that the total interference power inflicted at the primary receivers is less than a
predefined interference temperature [10]. Therefore, the transmit power of the SBS is constrained
as follows:
PS = min
(
PSmax ,
IP
E
[
Tr
(
VTWˆSWˆHS V
∗)]
)
, (9)
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where PSmax is the maximum transmit power at the SBS. Furthermore, IP is the primary interference
temperature, which is the maximum tolerable interference level that the PUs can endure without
compromising the quality-of-service. In (9), WˆS is the ZF precoder at the SBS and is defined as:
WˆS = αSGˆ∗
(
GˆTGˆ∗
)−1
, (10)
where αS is a power normalization factor at the SBS and is defined as [17]:
αS =
(
E
[
Tr
(
GˆTGˆ∗
)−1])1/2
=
√√√√ NS −M
∑Mm=1 σ
−2
Gˆm
. (11)
For a finite number of antennas at the SBS, the transmit power constraint can be re-written as:
PS = min
(
PSmax ,
IP
∆
)
, (12)
where ∆ is approximated as (see Appendix A.1 for derivation):
∆ ≈ α2STr
((
DTV + IM/τPU
)2D−2G )+ NS −MNS Tr(DG − DˆG)
+
(NS −M)
NSτPU
(
2Tr
(
DTG
(
DTG + D
T
V +
IM
τPU
)−1)
− 1
)
. (13)
Next, the asymptotic transmit power constraint at the secondary system for infinitely many BS
antenna can be derived by letting NS go to infinity in (12) as follows:
min
NS→∞
PS = PSmax . (14)
Remark 1. As NS → ∞, the secondary transmit power constraint (12) asymptotically becomes independent
of the interference temperature of the primary system. Consequently, the secondary system with underlay
spectrum sharing can be operated independent of the primary system, and hence, the secondary system can be
asymptotically operated at its maximum transmit power level.
2.3.2. Signal Model for the Primary System
It is assumed that the eavesdropper’s CSI is unavailable at both PBS and SBS. Consequently,
the PBS transmits an AN sequence for degrading the eavesdropper’s ability to decode the signals
transmitted to its PUs. To this end, the NP − K additional degrees-of-freedom offered by the large
antenna array at the PBS are used to transmit this AN. Thus, the PBS transmits both confidential data
and AN by using linear precoders in the downlink. In this context, the transmitted signal vector at the
PBS can be written as:
xPt =
√
PPWˆPxP +
√
PnWnan, (15)
where PP and Pn are the transmit powers allocated for confidential data and AN, respectively.
In (15), WˆP is the precoder used for pre-processing the confidential data at the PBS. Furthermore,
Wn ∈ CNP×(NP−K) is the AN shaping matrix at the PBS, and an is the AN vector and defined as
an ∼ CN (NP−K)×1
(
0NP−K, σ
2
AINP−K
)
. In particular, WˆP is designed based on the ZF criterion as:
WˆP = αPFˆ∗
(
FˆT Fˆ∗
)−1
, (16)
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where αP is a normalization constant, and is defined as:
αp =
(
E
[
Tr
(
FˆT Fˆ∗
)−1])1/2
=
√√√√ NP − K
∑Kk=1 σ
−2
Fˆk
. (17)
The construction of the AN shaping matrix can be described as follows: In conventional MIMO
systems, the AN shaping matrix (Wn) can be constructed by computing the null space of the desired
channel matrix (F). In this context, the performance degradation due to the leakage of AN into desired
signals can be mitigated. However, for a massive MIMO PBS, the computation of the null space based
precoders is prohibitively complicated. Hence, Wn can be constructed as the pseudo-inverse of a
random matrix with mutually independent Gaussian random vectors. To this end, the AN shaping
matrix can be defined as follows:
Wn = αnR∗n
(
RTn R
∗
n
)−1
, (18)
where RTn ∼ CN (NP−K)×NP
(
0(NP−K)×NP , INP−K ⊗ INP
)
, Wn ∈ CNP×(NP−K), and αn is defined as:
αn =
(
E
[
Tr
(
RTn R
∗
n
)−1])1/2
=
√
K
(NP − K) . (19)
In particular, Wn is designed as a normalized version of the pseudo-inverse of Rn. Therefore,
the aforementioned choice (18) facilitates the mathematical tractability of the asymptotic analysis.
The received signal vector at the PUs can be written as:
yP =
√
PPFTWˆPxP +
√
PSVTWˆSxS +
√
PnFTWnan + zP, (20)
where xP and xS are the transmitted signal vectors of the PBS and SBS satisfying E
[
xPxHP
]
= IK and
E
[
xSxHS
]
= IM, respectively. Furthermore, zP is the AWGN vector at the PUs satisfying E
[
zPzHP
]
=
IKσ2P. In (20), the first term accounts for the desired signal transmitted towards the PUs. The second
term captures the intra-cell interference due to the concurrent secondary transmissions in the same
frequency band. Moreover, the third term represents the AN leakage into the PUs.
Then, the received signal at the k-th PU (i.e., the k-th element of yP) can be expressed as:
yPk =
√
PPfTk wˆPk xPk +
K
∑
j=1,j 6=k
√
PPfTk wˆPj xPj +
√
PSvTk WˆSxS +
√
PnfTk Wnan + zPk , (21)
where wˆPk and fk are the k-th columns of WˆP and F, respectively, and xPk and zPk are the k-th element
of xP and zP, respectively.
2.3.3. Signal Model for the Secondary System
The SUs are served by the SBS, where the received signal at the SUs is:
yS =
√
PSGTWˆSxS +
√
PPUTWˆPxP +
√
PnUTWnan + zS, (22)
where the first term represents the desired signal at the SUs. The second term captures the intra-cell
interference from the concurrent primary transmissions. The third term accounts for the AN leakage
into the SU’s reception. Moreover, zS models the AWGN vector at the SUs satisfying E
[
zSzHS
]
= IMσ2S .
The received signal at the m-th SU can be written as:
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ySm =
√
PSgTmwˆSm xSm +
M
∑
j=1,j 6=m
√
PSgTmwˆSj xSj +
√
PSuTmWˆPxP +
√
PnuTmWnan + zSm , (23)
where wˆSm and gm are the m-th columns of WˆS and G, respectively, and xSm and zSm are the m-th
element of xS and zS, respectively.
2.3.4. Signal Model for the Eavesdropper
The eavesdropper is interested in eavesdropping upon the confidential data transmitted to either
PUs or SUs. For the sake of completeness, two cases, in which the eavesdropper intercepts (1) the k-th
PU’s signal and (2) the m-th SU’s signal, are investigated. To this end, a generic expression for the
received signal at the eavesdropper can be written as:
yE =
√
PPHTPWˆPxP +
√
PnHTPWnan +
√
PSHTS WˆSxS + zE (24)
where zE is the AWGN vector at the eavesdropper satisfying E
[
zEzHE
]
= INEσ
2
E. In (24), the first term
corresponds to the signal transmitted by the PBS, the second term accounts for the AN leakage, and
the third term captures the signal transmitted by the SBS. Then, the k-th PU signal intercepted at the
eavesdropper can be re-written as:
yEk =
√
PPhTPwˆPk xPk +
K
∑
j=1,j 6=k
√
PPhTPwˆPj xPj +
√
PnhTPWnan +
√
PShTS WˆSxS + zEk . (25)
Whereas, the m-th SU signal intercepted at the eavesdropper can be re-written as:
yEm =
√
PShTS wˆSm xSm +
M
∑
j=1,j 6=m
√
PShTS wˆSj xSj +
√
PnhTPWnan +
√
PPhTPWˆPxP + zEm . (26)
2.4. Achievable Rate Analysis
In this subsection, the achievable rate expressions at the PUs and SUs are derived by using the
worst-case Gaussian noise approximation technique. This technique is widely used in sum rate analysis
in wireless systems [17,18], and basically represents a lower bound of what can be achieved in practice.
Accordingly, by using (21), the received signal at the k-th PU can be re-written as:
yPk =
√
PPfTk wˆPk xPk + n˜Pk , (27)
where the first term accounts for the desired signal and n˜Pk represents the effective noise, which is
given by:
n˜Pk =
√
PP
(
fTk wˆPk −E
[
fTk wˆPk
])
xPk +
K
∑
j=1,j 6=k
√
PPfTk wˆPj xPj +
√
PSvTk WˆSxS
+
√
PnfTk Wnan + zPk . (28)
In (27), the desired signal and the effective noise are uncorrelated. The worst-case uncorrelated additive
noise is independent Gaussian noise having the same variance, hence, the achievable rate at the k-th
PU can be derived as:
RPk = log2
(
1+
∣∣E [√PPfTk wˆPk]∣∣2
PPVar(fTk wˆPk ) + IPk + ISk + ANk + σ
2
P
)
, (29)
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where IPk , ISk , and ANk account for the primary inter-user interference, intra-cell interference due to
concurrent secondary transmissions, and the AN leakage towards the k-th PU, respectively, and they
are defined as:
IPk = ∑
K
j=1,j 6=k PPE
[∣∣∣fTk wˆPj ∣∣∣2] , (30a)
ISk = PSE
[∥∥∥vTk WˆS∥∥∥2] , (30b)
ANk = PnE
[∥∥∥fTk Wn∥∥∥2] . (30c)
Similarly, by using (23), the received signal at the m-th SU can be re-written as:
ySm =
√
PSgTmwˆSm xSm + n˜Sm , (31)
where the first term represents the desired signal and n˜Sm is the effective noise, and is given by:
n˜Sm =
√
PS
(
gTmwˆSm −E
[
gTmwˆSm
])
xSm +
M
∑
j=1,j 6=m
√
PSgTmwˆSj xSj +
√
PSuTmWˆPxP
+
√
PnuTmWnan + zSm . (32)
Hence, the achievable rate at the m-th SU can be derived as:
RSm = log2
(
1+
∣∣E [√PSgTmwˆSm]∣∣2
PSVar(gTmwˆSm) + ISm + IPm + ANm + σ2S
)
, (33)
where ISm , IPm , and ANm represent the secondary inter-user interference, the CCI from SBS
transmissions, and the AN leakage towards the m-th SU, respectively, and they are defined as:
ISm =
M
∑
j=1,j 6=m
PSE
[∣∣∣gTmwˆSj ∣∣∣2] , (34a)
IPm = PPE
[∥∥∥uTmWˆP∥∥∥2] , (34b)
ANm = PnE
[∥∥∥uTmWn∥∥∥2] . (34c)
3. Secrecy Rate Analysis
An achievable secrecy rate of the k-th PU is given by the difference between channel capacities of
the PBS to PU channel and the PBS to eavesdropper channel. Thus, the achievable secrecy rate at the
k-th PU is:
RsecPk =
[RPk −Revek ]+ , (35)
where [λ]+ = max(0,λ).
A lower bound for the achievable rate at the k-th PU can be derived from (29) as (see Appendix A.2
for the derivation):
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RPk ≈
(
T−τ
T
)
log2
(
1+
PP(NP−K)∑Kj=1 σ2Fˆj
PP
(
ζFk
−σ2
Fˆk
)
+PS(NS−M)
(
M
∑
j=1
σ2
Gˆj
(
ζ−1Gm(ζVk+
1
τPU
)
)2
+ 1NS
(
2ζGm /τPU
ζGm+ζVk
+1/τPU
− 1τPU +ζGm−σ
2
Gˆm
))
+Pn
KζFk
NP−K+σ
2
P
)
.
(36)
The eavesdropper’s rate, on the other hand, cannot be lower bounded, since in that case the obtained
secrecy rate is no longer a lower bound. Thus, the ergodic rate of the k-th PU signal leaked into the
eavesdropper is computed asRevek = E
[
log2(1+ γEk )
]
, where γEk is a closed-form expression for the
SINR of the k-th PU signal intercepted at the eavesdropper, which is derived from (24) as (by assuming
eavesdropper is able to mitigate inter-pair interference [13]):
γEk =
∣∣∣√PPhTPk wˆPk ∣∣∣2
PS
[
HTS WˆSWˆ
H
S H
∗
S
]
k,k + Pn
[
HTPWnW
H
n H∗P
]
k,k + σ
2
E
. (37)
Similarly, the achievable secrecy rate of the m-th SU is:
RsecSm = [RSm −Revem ]+ , (38)
where RSm is an achievable rate of the m-th SU and its lower bound is derived by following steps
similar to those used for deriving (36) as:
RSm ≈
(
T−τ
T
)
log2
(
1+
PS(NS−M)∑Mj=1σ2Gˆj
PS
(
ζGm−σ2Gˆm
)
+PP(NP−K)
(
K
∑
j=1
σ2
Fˆj
(
ζ−1Fk (ζUm+
1
τPU
)
)2
+ 1NP
(
2ζFk
/τPU
ζFk
+ζUm+1/τPU
− 1τPU +ζFk−σ
2
Fˆk
))
+Pn
KζUm
NP−K+σ
2
S
)
.
(39)
Furthermore,Revem is the information leakage rate to the eavesdropper for decoding the m-th SU’s
confidential information, and can be computed as: Revem = E [log2(1+ γEm)], where γEm is the SINR
expression of the m-th SU signal intercepted at the eavesdropper, which is derived from (24) as:
γEm =
∣∣∣√PShTSm wˆSm ∣∣∣2
PP
[
HTPWˆPWˆ
H
P H
∗
P
]
m,m + Pn
[
HTPWnW
H
n H∗P
]
m,m + σ
2
E
. (40)
4. Asymptotic Secrecy Rate Analysis
In this section, the asymptotic secrecy rates are derived whenever the numbers of antennas at
the PBS and SBS grow without limit while keeping a fixed ratio β = NP/NS. In this context, the pilot
transmit power is assumed to be fixed, whereas the transmit powers at the PBS and SBS are scaled as
follows: PP = EP/NP, Pn = En/NP, and PS = ES/NS, where EP, En, and ES are constants [3]. Hence,
by letting NP, NS → ∞ in (35), the corresponding achievable secrecy rate for the case in which the
eavesdropper intends to intercept the confidential signal transmitted to the k-th PU can be derived as
(see Appendix A.3 for the derivation):
RsecPk ,∞ =
(
T − τ
T
)
log2
1+ EP∑Kj=1 σ2Fˆj
ESmax ∑
M
j=1 σ
2
Gˆj
(
ζ−1Gm(ζVk +
1
τPU
)
)2
+σ2P
 . (41)
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The corresponding achievable secrecy rate for the case in which the eavesdropper is intercepting
the confidential signal transmitted to the m-th SU can be derived, by letting NP, NS → ∞ in (38),
as (see Appendix A.3 for the derivation):
RsecSm ,∞ =
(
T − τ
T
)
log2
1+
ESmax
M
∑
m=1
σ2Gˆm
EP ∑Kj=1 σ
2
Fˆj
(
ζ−1Fk (ζUm +
1
τPU
)
)2
+σ2S
 . (42)
Remark 2. The achievable asymptotic secrecy rate expressions in (41) and (42) are independent of the
BS-to-eavesdropper channels. Consequently, the corresponding information leakage rate at the eavesdropper
vanishes in the limit of infinitely many BS antennas.
In particular, the transmit powers of the payload data at both BSs and the transmit power of
AN sequence at the PBS can be scaled inversely proportional to the number of BS antennas without
incurring any performance penalty. Moreover, the asymptotic secrecy rates are independent of the fast
fading components of the corresponding wireless channels.
5. Performance Analysis for Perfect CSI
For further investigations, the performance analysis of the considered system is provided in this
section for the idealistic scenario of having perfect CSI, i.e., Fˆ = F and Gˆ = G. Hence, the amounts of
performance degradation due to inaccurate channel knowledge and pilot contamination are quantified
and compared. To this end, the ZF detectors at the PBS and SBS can be constructed by assuming the
availability of the genie-aided perfect CSI as follows:
WP =
F∗
(
FTF∗
)−1√
Tr((FTF∗)−1)
, (43)
WS =
G∗
(
GTG∗
)−1√
Tr((GTG∗)−1)
. (44)
5.1. Secondary Transmit Power Constraint for Perfect CSI Case
The secondary transmit power constraint for perfect CSI can be re-written as:
PS = min
PSmax , IPTr
((
GTG∗
NS
)−1)
NSTr
((
VTG∗
NS
) (
GTG∗
NS
)−1 (GTG∗
NS
)−1 (GTV∗
NS
))
 . (45)
Next, the maximum transmit power at the SBS is scaled inversely proportional to the number of
antennas as PSmax = ESmax /NS. The secondary transmit power constraint can then be rewritten as:
PS = min
ESmaxNS ,
(
IP
NS
)
Tr
((
GGH
NS
)−1)
Tr
((
VGH
NS
) (
GGH
NS
)−1 (GGH
NS
)−1 (GVH
NS
))
 . (46)
By first letting NS → ∞ in (46) and then using the identities (A15) and (A16) given in the appendix,
an asymptotic expression for the transmit power constraint at the SBS can be derived as:
lim
NS→∞
PSNS → ESmax . (47)
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5.2. Achievable Rate Analysis for Perfect CSI Case
In this subsection, the achievable rate at the PUs, SUs, and eavesdropper are derived by replacing WTP
and WTS with Wˆ
T
P and Wˆ
T
S in (20), (22), and (24), respectively. To this end, by using (20), the achievable
rate at the k-th primary user node can be computed asRPk = E
[
log2(1+ γPk)
]
, where γPk is:
γPk =
PP
/
Tr
(
(FTF∗)−1
)
Pn [FTWnWHn F∗]k,k + PS
[
VTWSWHS V
∗]
k,k + σ
2
P
. (48)
Similarly, by using (22), the achievable rate at the m-th secondary user node can be derived as
RSm = E [log2(1+ γSm)], where γSm is given by
γSm =
PS
/
Tr
(
(GTG∗)−1
)
PP
[
UTWPWHP U
∗]
m,m + Pn [U
TWnWHn U∗]m,m + σ2S
. (49)
Next, by using (24) and by assuming the eavesdropper is capable of fully mitigating the
inter-substream interference, the information leakage rate to the eavesdropper for decoding the
k-th PU’s confidential information is computed as Revek = E
[
log2(1+ γEk)
]
, where γEk is the SINR
expression of the k-th PU signal intercepted at the eavesdropper, which is given by:
γEk =
PP
[
HTPWPW
H
P H
∗
P
]
k,k
PS
[
HTS WSW
H
S H
∗
S
]
k,k + Pn
[
HTPWnW
H
n H∗P
]
k,k + σ
2
E
. (50)
Similarly, the rate of the m-th SU signal leaked into the eavesdropper is computed as Revem =
E [log2(1+ γEm)], where γEm is a closed-form expression for the SINR of the m-th SU signal intercepted
at the eavesdropper, which is derived from (24) as:
γEm =
PS
[
HTS WSW
H
S H
∗
S
]
m,m
PP
[
HTPWPW
H
P H
∗
P
]
m,m + Pn
[
HTPWnW
H
n H∗P
]
m,m + σ
2
E
. (51)
5.3. Asymptotic Secrecy Rate Analysis for Perfect CSI Case
In this subsection, the asymptotic secrecy rate expressions are derived for both primary and
secondary systems when the numbers of antennas at the PBS and SBS grow without limit, while
keeping a fixed ratio β = NP = NS. In this context, the transmit powers at the PBS and SBS are scaled
inversely proportional to the number of BS antennas as PP = EP/NP, Pn = En/NP, and PS = ES/NS,
where EP, En, and ES are constants. Whenever NP and NS grow without bound, the corresponding
achievable secrecy rate for the case in which the eavesdropper intends to intercept the confidential
signal transmitted to the k-th primary user is derived as (see Appendix B for the derivation):
RsecPk,∞ = limNP,NS→∞R
sec
Pk = log
1+ EP
σ2PTr
(
D−1F
)
 . (52)
Similarly, the corresponding asymptotic secrecy rate for the case in which the eavesdropper
intends to intercept the confidential signal transmitted to the m-th SU is given by:
RsecSm,∞ = limNP,NS→∞R
sec
Sm = log
1+ ESmax
σ2STr
(
D−1G
)
 . (53)
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Remark 3. The achievable asymptotic secrecy rate expressions in (52) and (53) are independent of the
BS-to-eavesdropper channels. Consequently, the corresponding rate at the eavesdropper vanishes in the limit of
infinitely many BS antennas.
6. Numerical Results
In Figure 2, the achievable secrecy sum rates at the PUs and SUs are plotted. Furthermore,
the information leakage rates to the eavesdropper from the primary and secondary transmissions
are plotted against NP while keeping NE fixed. The exact (simulation) curves are generated by
using (29), (33), (37), and (40) through Monte-Carlo simulations. Moreover, the asymptotic secrecy
rate is plotted by using (41) and (42). Figure 2 reveals that the corresponding information leakage
rates to the eavesdropper asymptotically vanish when NP → ∞ and NS → ∞. Hence, the secrecy
rate asymptotically approaches the achievable rate at the user nodes. Therefore, the intra-cell
pilot contamination effects in cognitive massive MIMO systems do not hinder the use of random
pseudo-inverse based AN shaping matrices.
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Figure 2. The achievable secrecy rates versus the number of PBS antennas for imperfect channel state
information (CSI) case.
To investigate the impact of the primary interference temperatures on the secondary system
transmissions for the imperfect and perfect CSI cases, the transmit power constraint of the SUs is
plotted, in Figure 3, against the number of PBS antennas for two different primary interference
temperatures. The asymptotic transmit power constraints are plotted by using the asymptotic analysis
in (14) and (47), while the exact curves are plotted by using Monte-Carlo simulations. Figure 3 clearly
reveals that the transmit power of the secondary system approaches its allowable peak value when
the number of PBS antennas grows large. However, the rate of asymptotic convergence depends on
the CSI assumption and the primary interference temperature. Specifically, the curves corresponding
to imperfect CSI exhibit the lowest rate of asymptotic convergence compared to the perfect CSI
case. Moreover, the asymptotic rate of convergence decreases whenever the primary interference
temperature decreases.
In Figure 4, the transmit power constraint at the secondary system is plotted versus the number of
PBS antennas by varying the number of user nodes for the cases of imperfect and perfect CSI. Figure 4
Entropy 2017, 19, 349 14 of 21
shows that the secondary system transmit power asymptotically approaches its peak level as the
number of PBS antennas grows without bound, irrespective of the number of user nodes. Nevertheless,
the rate of asymptotic convergence decreases when the numbers of user nodes increase. Therefore, the
secondary system can asymptotically be operated at its peak transmit power, regardless of the number
of user nodes and primary interference temperature, whenever the PBS is equipped with a very large
antenna array.
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Figure 3. The transmit power constraint of the secondary system versus the number of PBS antennas
by varying IP.
0 200 400 600 800 1000
Number of PBS Antennas  ( NP)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
Tr
an
sm
it 
Po
w
er
 C
on
st
ra
in
t -
 S
ec
on
da
ry
 U
se
r N
od
es
Asymptotic Analysis
Perfect CSI (K = M = 4)
Perfect CSI (K = M = 6)
Perfect CSI (K = M = 8)
Imperfect CSI (K = M = 4)
Imperfect CSI (K = M = 6)
Imperfect CSI (K = M = 8)
Simulation Parameters: 
Pathloss [PL]dB=PL0+10nlog(d/d0)
Pathloss exponent (n) = 2.1
Reference distance (d0) = 10m
PS(max) = 32 dBm
 = 2, T = 196, and C = 4K
dF = dG = 100 m , and  dU= dV= 150 m
Figure 4. The transmit power constraint of the secondary system versus the number of PBS antennas
by varying M.
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Figure 5 depicts the achievable secrecy rate of the primary and secondary systems against the
number of PBS antennas for the perfect CSI case. The asymptotic secrecy rate curves are plotted by
using (52) and (53), whereas the exact sum rate curves are plotted by using Monte-Carlo simulations.
As shown in Figure 5, for a fixed number of antennas at the eavesdropper (NE = 100), the achievable
secrecy rates at the primary and secondary systems go up gradually with the growing of NP and NS
until they approach their corresponding asymptotic curves, which basically means the capability of
the eavesdropper decreases and eventually vanishes whenever the number of antennas grows large.
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Figure 5. The achievable secrecy rates versus the number of PBS antennas for perfect CSI case.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, a secure communication model for cognitive multi-user massive MIMO networks
with underlay spectrum sharing has been proposed and analyzed. The extra degrees-of-freedom
provided by the massive MIMO have been exploited to transmit AN sequences to incapacitate the
eavesdropper’s ability to decode the confidential data. The asymptotic achievable secrecy rates of
this system model have been derived in closed form for imperfect and perfect CSI cases. Thereby,
the detrimental effects of AN leakage into the desired signals and performance degradation due
to pilot contamination have been investigated. Random AN shaping matrices can be employed
in this model, and avoid the complication of designing a null-space based precoder, without any
asymptotic performance penalty. The transmit power allocated for the AN sequence can be scaled
down inversely proportional to the number of PBS antennas, and hence, a significant energy efficiency
gain can be attained. The secondary transmit power constraint becomes independent of the primary
interference temperature, and consequently, the secondary system can be operated independent of
the primary system in the limit of infinitely many BS antennas. The asymptotic information leakage
into the eavesdropper vanishes whenever the numbers of PBS and SBS antennas grow without bound,
and hence, the asymptotic secrecy rates become independent of the BS-to-eavesdropper channels.
Therefore, our work brings some valuable designing insights on physical layer security analysis in
cognitive massive MIMO networks, and proposes an elegant mechanism for strengthening the security
of communications against the potential attacks in the cognitive radio networks.
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Appendix A. Derivations for the Performance Metrics for Imperfect CSI Case
In this appendix, derivations for the secrecy performance metrics are outlined. The achievable
rates at the primary and secondary systems, and the transmit power constraint are derived arbitrarily
for many antennas at the PBS and SBS. The asymptotic secrecy rates corresponding to the primary and
secondary systems are derived when the numbers of antennas at the BS grow large.
Appendix A.1. Transmit Power Constraint at the Secondary System
The transmit power constraint in (9) can be re-written as:
PS = min (PSmax , IP/∆) , (A1)
where ∆ = E
[
Tr
(
VTWˆSWˆHS V
∗)]. To begin with, Gˆ and VT are dependent; the channel VT , by
using (6), can be re-written as:
VT = D˜−1G Gˆ
T −GT − Z
T
G√
τPU
, (A2)
where,
D˜G = DTG
(
DTG + D
T
V +
IM
τPU
)−1
. (A3)
Then, by using (A2), ∆ can be derived as follows:
∆ = E
[
Tr
((
D˜−1G Gˆ
T −GT − Z
T
G√
τPU
)
WˆSWˆHS
(
Gˆ∗D˜−1G −G∗ −
Z∗G√
τPU
))]
= Tr
(
E
[(
D˜−1G Gˆ
TWˆS −
(
GˆT + ETG
)
WˆS −
ZTG√
τPU
WˆS
)
(
WˆHS Gˆ
∗D˜−1G − WˆHS
(
Gˆ∗ + E∗G
)− WˆHS Z∗G√τPU
)])
= Tr
(
E
[
α2SD˜
−2
G − 2α2SD˜−1G − D˜−1G GˆTWˆSWˆHS
Z∗G√
τPU
+ α2SIM
+ ETGWˆSWˆHS E∗G + GˆTWˆSWˆHS
Z∗G√
τPU
− Z
T
G√
τPU
WˆSWHS Gˆ
∗D˜−1G
+
ZTG√
τPU
WˆSWHS Gˆ
∗D˜−1G +
ZTG√
τPU
WˆSWˆHS
Z∗G√
τPU
])
. (A4)
Here, from (10), WˆSWˆHS = α
2
SGˆ
∗ (GˆTGˆ∗)−1 (GˆTGˆ∗)−1 GˆT , since NS  M, the law of large numbers
can be used to do this approximation, GˆTGˆ∗ ≈ NSDˆG, and consequently, WˆSWˆHS ≈
α2S
N2S
Gˆ∗Dˆ−2G Gˆ
T .
Moreover, the term ZTGGˆ
∗, by using (6) can be simplified as D˜GZTGZ
∗
G/
√
τPU . Thus,
∆ ≈ α2STr
((
D˜−1G − IM
)2)
+
NS −M
NS
(
Tr
(
DG − DˆG
)
+
2
τPU
Tr
(
D˜G
)− 1
τPU
)
. (A5)
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By substituting (A5) into (9), the transmit power constraint for finitely many SBS antennas can be
derived as shown in (12).
Appendix A.2. RPk for Finite Antenna Numbers
The achievable rate at the k-th PU is derived when both BSs are equipped with finite antenna
numbers. From (29) the desired power can be derived as (FTWˆP) by invoking (16) and (4) as follows:
FTWˆP = (FˆT + ETF )WˆP
= αPIK + ETF WˆP. (A6)
Then, the desired power for the k-th PU can be re-written as:
fTk wˆPk = αP + ETFk wˆPk (A7)
where ETFk is the k-th column of ETF , since wˆPk and ETFk are uncorrelated, and ETFk is a zero-mean random
variable, E[ETFk wˆPk ] = 0. Thus,
E
[
fTk wˆPk
]
= αP. (A8)
Next, the first term of the effective noise in (29), Var(fTk wˆPk ), can be derived by using (A7) and (A8) as:
Var(fTk wˆPk ) = E
[∣∣∣ETFk wˆPk ∣∣∣2]
= (ζFk − σ2Fˆk )E
[∥∥wˆPk∥∥2]
= α2P(ζFk − σ2Fˆk )E
[[(
Fˆ∗FˆT
)−1]
k,k
]
=
α2P
(
ζFk − σ2Fˆk
)
σ2
Fˆk
K
E
[
Tr(X−1)
]
=
α2P
(
ζFk − σ2Fˆk
)
σ2
Fˆk
(NP − K)
. (A9)
where X is a K×K central Wishart matrix with NP degrees of freedom and covariance matrix IK, where
Tr(X−1) = K/(NP − K) [19].
The derivations for the remaining terms of the effective noise in (30) are given in the following:
• Deriving IPk : From (A6), fTk wˆPj = ETFk wˆTPj for j 6= k. Since ETFk and wˆPj are uncorrelated, then,
E
[∣∣∣fTk wˆPj ∣∣∣2] = (ζFk − σ2Fˆk)E
[∥∥∥wˆPj∥∥∥2]
=
α2P
(
ζFk − σ2Fˆk
)
σ2
Fˆj
(NP − K)
. (A10)
Hence,
IPk = PP
K
∑
j=1,j 6=k
α2P
(
ζFk − σ2Fˆk
)
σ2
Fˆj
(NP − K)
. (A11)
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• Deriving ISk : From (30b), ISk can be re-written as:
PSE
[∥∥∥vTk WˆS∥∥∥2] = PSE [vTk WˆSWˆHS v∗k] . (A12)
By following the same derivation steps that used to drive Z in (A5), ISk can be approximated as:
ISk ≈ PS(NS −M)
(
∑Mj=1 σ2Gˆj
(
ζ−1Gm(ζVk + 1/τPU)
)2
+
1
NS
(
2ζGm /τPU
ζGm + ζVk + 1/τPU
− 1
τPU
+ ζGm − σ2Gˆm
))
. (A13)
• Deriving ANk: Similarly, ANk can be derived as:
PnE
[∥∥∥fTk Wn∥∥∥2] = PnKζFkNP − K . (A14)
Next, by substituting (A8), (A9), (A11), (A13), and (A14) into (29), a lower bound approximation for
the achievable rate at the k-th PU can be derived as shown in (36).
Appendix A.3. Asymptotic Achievable Rate at the Eavesdropper
To evaluate the asymptotic achievable rate at the eavesdropper when the PBS and SBS are
deploying massive antenna arrays, the following identities are recalled from [20].
For a random matrix A ∈ CM×N having elements of zero mean and unit variance, as N → ∞ the
column vectors of A become orthogonal, and hence, the following identity holds:
lim
N→∞
AAH/N = IM. (A15)
Also, whenever a random matrix B ∈ CM×N is independently distributed with A, the following
identity holds:
lim
N→∞
ABH/N = 0. (A16)
By first letting PP = EP/NP and Pn = En/NP, and then by substituting (10), (16), and (18) into (37),
the SINR of the k-th PU signal intercepted at the eavesdropper can be re-written as:
γEk =
EPα2P
NP
[(
HTP Fˆ
∗
NP
)(
FˆT Fˆ∗
NP
)−2 ( FˆTH∗P
NP
)]
k,k
ESα2S
NS
[(
HTS Gˆ
∗
NS
)(
GˆTGˆ∗
NS
)−2 ( GˆTH∗S
NS
)]
k,k
+ Enα
2
n
NP
[(
HTPR
∗
n
NP
)(
RTn R∗n
NP
)−2 (RTn H∗P
NP
)]
k,k
+ σ2E
. (A17)
Next, by letting NP → ∞ and NS → ∞ in (A17) and then by invoking (A15) and (A16), it can be shown that:
lim
NP,NS→∞
γEk = 0. (A18)
Similarly, by using (40), the SINR at the eavesdropper, who is interested in intercepting the signal
of the m-th SU, can be re-written as:
γEm =
ESα2S
NS
[(
HTS Gˆ
∗
NS
)(
GˆTGˆ∗
NS
)−2( GˆTH∗S
NS
)]
m,m
EPα2P
NP
[(
HTP Fˆ
∗
NP
)(
FˆT Fˆ∗
NP
)−2( FˆTH∗P
NP
)]
m,m
+ Enα
2
n
NP
[(
HTPR
∗
n
NP
)(
RTn R∗n
NP
)−2(RTn H∗P
NP
)]
m,m
+ σ2E
. (A19)
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Then, by invoking (A15) and (A16), and when NS and NP go to infinity in (A19), it can be shown that:
lim
NP,NS→∞
γEm = 0. (A20)
Appendix B. Derivations the Asymptotic Performance Metrics for Perfect CSI
In this appendix, the derivations of the asymptotic rates of primary and secondary systems with
perfect CSI are outlined. To begin with, by letting PP = EP/NP, Pn = En/NP, and PS = ES/NS and then
by substituting (43), (44) and (18) into (48), the end-to-end SINR at the k-th PU can be re-written as:
γPk =
EP
/
Tr
((
FTF∗
NP
)−1)
Enσ2n
Tr
((
RTn R
∗
n
NP
)−1)
[(
FTR∗n
NP
)(
RTn R∗n
NP
)−2(RTn F∗
NP
)]
k,k
+ PSNS
Tr
((
GTG∗
NS
)−1)
[(
VTG∗
NS
)(
GTG∗
NS
)−2(GTV∗
NS
)]
k,k
+ σ2P
. (A21)
Next, by letting NS → ∞ and NP → ∞ in (A21) and then by using (47), (A15) and (A16), the asymptotic
SINR for the k-th PU can be written as:
γ∞Pk =
EP
σ2PTr
(
D−1F
) . (A22)
Moreover, by using steps similar to those used for deriving (A21), the end-to-end SINR at the
m-th SU can be re-written as:
γSm =
PSNS
/
Tr
((
GTG∗
NS
)−1)
Enσ2n
Tr
((
RTn R
∗
n
NP
)−1)
[(
UTR∗n
NP
)(
RTn R∗n
NP
)−2(RTn U∗
NP
)]
m,m
+ EP
Tr
((
FTF∗
NP
)−1)
[(
UTF∗
NP
)(
FTF∗
NP
)−2( FTU∗
NP
)]
m,m
+σ2S
. (A23)
Again, by letting NS → ∞ and NP → ∞ in (A23) and then by using (47), (A15) and (A16),
the asymptotic SINR for the m-th SU can be written as:
γ∞Sm =
ESmax
σ2STr
(
D−1G
) . (A24)
Furthermore, the end-to-end SINR at the eavesdropper, who is interested in intercepting the
signal of the k-th PU, can be obtained by substituting (44), (43) and (18) into (37) as follows:
γEk =
EP
[(
HTPF
∗
NP
)(
FTF∗
NP
)−2( FTH∗P
NP
)]
k,k
/
Tr
((
FTF∗
NP
)−1)
PSNS
Tr
((
GGH
NS
)−1)
[(
HSGH
NS
)(
FGH
NS
)−2(GHHS
NS
)]
k,k
+ Enσ
2
n
Tr
((
RTn R
∗
n
NP
)−1)
[(
HTPR
∗
n
NP
)(
RTn R∗n
NP
)−2(RTn H∗P
NP
)]
k,k
+σ2E
. (A25)
Next, by letting NS → ∞ and NP → ∞ in (A25) and then by using (47), (A15) and (A16), the asymptotic
SINR at the eavesdropper, who is interested in intercepting the signal of the k-th PU, can be derived as:
lim
NP,NS→∞
γEk = γ
∞
Ek → 0. (A26)
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Similarly, by substituting (44), (43) and (18) into (40), the end-to-end SINR at the eavesdropper, who is
interested in intercepting the signal of the m-th SU, can be re-written as:
γEm =
PSNS
[(
HTS G
∗
NS
)(
GTG∗
NS
)−2(GTH∗S
NS
)]
m,m
/
Tr
((
GTG∗
NS
)−1)
EP
Tr
((
FTF∗
NP
)−1)
[(
HTPF
∗
NP
)(
FTF∗
NP
)−2(FTH∗P
NP
)]
m,m
+ Enσ
2
n
Tr
((
RTn R
H
n
NP
)−1)
[(
HTPR
∗
n
NP
)(
RTn R∗n
NP
)−2(RTn H∗P
NP
)]
m,m
+σ2E
. (A27)
Again, by letting NS → ∞ and NP → ∞ in (A27) and then by using (47), (A15) and (A16), the
asymptotic SINR at the eavesdropper, who is interested in intercepting the signal of the m-th SU, can
be derived as:
lim
NP,NS→∞
γEm = γ
∞
Em → 0. (A28)
Next, by using (35), an achievable asymptotic secrecy rate at the k-th PU can be written as:
RsecPk,∞ =
[
log
(
1+ γ∞Pk
)
− log
(
1+ γ∞Ek
)]+
. (A29)
By substituting (A22) and (A26) into (A29), the desired asymptotic secrecy rate can be derived as
given in (52).
Similarly, by using (35), the asymptotic secrecy rate at the m-th SU can be written as:
RsecSm,∞ =
[
log
(
1+ γ∞Sm
)− log (1+ γ∞Em)]+ . (A30)
By substituting (A24) and (A28) into (A30), the desired asymptotic secrecy rate can be derived as
given in (53).
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